Definition of Battle of Cannae

There are people and events that, due to their importance, become references that are studied in schools and academies throughout history.

This is the case of the Battle of Cannas (Cannae by its Latin name), fought on August 2, 216 BC. C, and that is still studied today in military academies for the way in which Hannibal made his troops surpass the Roman ones.

The Battle of Cannas was a confrontation fought, within the framework of the Second Punic War, between the Carthaginian forces and their allies, commanded by Aníbal, and the Roman legions and their allies commanded by the consuls Cayo Terencio Varrón and Lucio Emilio Paul.

Cannas would constitute the third great disaster in this war for the Romans, after Trebia and Trasimeno. But let's not anticipate events.

After the disastrous battle of Trasimeno, Rome appointed Quinto Fabio Máximo dictator, who applied a policy of scorched earth and harassment of the Carthaginian forces.

Fabius hoped that he would have enough time to prepare a new Roman army capable enough to confront the Carthaginian hosts but, in the meantime, he knew that he had to shy away from combat in the open field, as he could only count on legions too fledgling.

He was also aware of Hannibal's military genius, just as he knew that the Carthaginians lacked the means and supports necessary to directly attack Rome or to maintain lasting sieges in large cities.

Against him loomed the fact that, while the Romans did nothing but harass, the hosts of Hannibal ravaged the lands of the allies of Rome, with which some of these began to weigh the change of side.

The unpopularity of these tactics among the common people was also remarkable. Fabio was branded a coward, and shunned from fighting with Hannibal. Therefore, at the end of his dictatorship, Fabio did not see his mandate renewed.

However, the new consuls Cayo Terencio Varrón and Lucio Emilio Paulo, had to be grateful that the prudence of Fabio allowed them to have the largest Roman army assembled to date, and estimated at about 90,000 men, according to the sources.

The taking of Cannas, a supply center for Rome, made the consuls decide to march to the battle, to the great jubilation of the crowds, who waited and yearned for a swift end to the war.

Of the 90,000 men that the Romans gathered, about 6-7,000 corresponded to cavalry, while the rest were infantry. Before these, Aníbal could line up about 55,000 men, about 8,000 of them cavalry and the rest infantry. The imbalance was evident.

However, the Roman command (which was to alternate between the two consuls) was divided as to proceeding, with the consul Varro more reckless and impulsive, while Emilio Paulo was more reflective and less daring.

Knowing the character of both, Aníbal would know how to exploit these differences, attacking when Varro was in command.

The days before the Battle, with both armies camped face to face, various skirmishes took place, with control of the river Aufidus as the axis.

On the day of the battle, the Romans opted for the most common tactic in classical battles: infantry in the center, with cavalry protecting both wings. Bliss training it gave armies the ability to hold out in the center and respond quickly from the wings with cavalry to any successful onslaught by the enemy, reinforcing their own lines.

The Carthaginian formation, on the other hand, presented a semicircle with the center pointing outwards, towards the Roman lines, with the cavalry also distributed in the wings, but with a greater number of troops in the wing left.

Hannibal's infantry formation gave the false impression of being weaker than the Roman one, although the general Carthaginian had placed his best and most disciplined troops in the center, precisely where he wanted the Romans to will attack.

Although such a choice would have seemed reckless or a real suicide to more than one strategist of the time, but Hannibal knew what he was doing, and when the two armies advanced, he pushed back to their center as the flanks.

In this way, what was a semicircle projecting towards the Roman front soon became one that enveloped the legions.

At the same time, the Punic cavalry of the left wing, quickly defeated their Roman counterpart, which they faced, and when this happened, a part of said cavalry He swiftly crossed the field behind the Roman rear to attack the Roman cavalry protecting the left wing of the Roman formation from behind and annihilate it.

As the Roman center advanced, Hannibal let it progress in a controlled way, delaying his troops, but only in the center, while the wings resisted or even advanced.

Soon the Carthaginian formation began to surround the Roman, to surround it.

That was the intention of Hannibal, who by surrounding the Romans, took away their main advantage: numerical superiority.

Being in the circumference inside the circle, the Roman line was smaller than the Carthaginian one, for which a smaller number of legionaries were in front of the Carthaginian warriors.

From that moment on, the slaughter that Hannibal's troops committed to the Romans was total.

With no room to maneuver and terrified of not being able to escape from that infernal circle, the Legionnaires and their commanders who were inside, had to see how their comrades in arms from first row They fell one after another, and knowing that, unfailingly, this was also their end, it was only a matter of time.

Of the nearly 90,000 men who initially made up the Roman army who faced Hannibal at Cannae, it is estimated that between 50 and 70,000 could have lost their lives, and that the number of prisoners would not drop in any case of 10,000, although like everything in the ancient world, there are different figures according to the historians who have treated the battle.

The consequences of the disaster were that the Roman army did not dare to face Hannibal in Italy again open field, and the Roman strategy pivoted to deprive the Carthaginian of its resources by attacking the rear in Hispania.

The Romans also analyzed the details of the battle, and with the conclusions they drew from these, they modified certain aspects of their army.

Aníbal also failed to exploit the success of Cannas well, which combined with the strategic reorientation of the war that Rome carried out, allowed the latter to obtain victory in the whole of the war.

Cannas, just as Trebia and Trasimeno had been, ended up being Pyrrhic victories for Hannibal.

I said at the beginning that the tactic used by Hannibal is still the object of study in military academies today. This is so because it is the first time in history that an "enveloping maneuver" was carried out.

That of Aníbal can be considered “of Handbook"The problem is that, then, there was no manual where it was written, he created it. And that is precisely the merit of the great general.

Photo: Fotolia

Themes in Battle of Cannae